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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 51 
Accident time: 07:30 Accident Date: 08/07/1998 
Where it occurred: Cap Agua (reservoir), 
Uige 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: TH/MB/GP undated Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast Ground condition: sandy 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
 
Accident report 
An undated accident report was on file at the Angolan MAC. Written in Portuguese by a team 
including an ex-pat Training Officer assigned to the group involved in the accident, the 
following summarises its content.  
The report stated that the accident area was mined with PPM-2s laid in defence of water 
tanks, and its perimeter was fenced with barbed wire. The Board of Inquiry visited the site on 
15th and 16th of July [text actually recorded “June”] 1998. Demining had ceased after the 
1 
accident. The ground was flat with sparse vegetation and the soil was sandy and compact 
allowing the use of a mine detector. However, the extent of metal contamination made 
detecting unfeasible for the type of mines already encountered. The deminers were clearing 
exploratory lanes to find the direction and density of the minefield. It was found that type 
PPM-2 AP mines had been laid 2m apart and in the pattern of a semi-circle.  
At 07:30, [or 08:15 elsewhere] having only cleared a meter, the victim noticed that the 
marking stakes ahead of him were out of alignment so went into the adjoining exploratory 
lane to reposition them. He pushed a stake onto a mine that was on the border of the lane. He 
suffered light injuries on both arms. A quantity of earth was thrown up into his eyes, the skin 
of his face was lacerated and his right hand became inflamed. He was not wearing a visor. No 
one else was injured. 
The paramedics attended the victim before he was taken to hospital in Uige where he was 
"put on a drip". The local hospital did not have medication suitable for the treatment of the 
victim's injuries. Later that day he was "flown" to Luanda Military Hospital. At the time of the 
report the victim had already recovered his sight. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was negligent because he did not inspect the lane 
before starting work. They found no weaknesses in the training of the persons involved but 
observed that the marking of the minefield prevented adequate control and that the base lane 
was 1m wide instead of 2m wide. They also noted that a number of openings into the 
minefield were not marked and concluded that there were failings in the system of command 
and control by the Section Chief. 




The investigators did not think it necessary to modify training or SOPs. They recommended 
that other excavation equipment be used because deminers reported their current trowel was 
too heavy, and on hard ground they preferred to use bayonets. They further recommended 
that mined area markings be corrected and that the base lane should be completed to a width 
of 2m before demining was resumed. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 70 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 








No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was operating in breach of SOPs but went uncorrected.  
Unusually, the accident investigators identified their own primary causes of the accident. They 
blamed the failure of demining group managers to ensure that the deminers were paid and 
the issue of inappropriate excavation tools. Accordingly, the secondary cause is listed as a 
“Management/control inadequacy”. 
The failure to clear to the edge of the lane and an overlap was not identified by the 
investigators.  
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